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Laurence BonJour (1998) has recently proposed an a priori solution to the problem of induction.  
According to BonJour, it is necessarily true that explanations involving ordinary inductive 
conclusions are the best explanations of inductive premises, and we can be justified in believing 
this fact a priori.  He contends that no empiricist account of justification that rejects or 
denigrates the a priori has any hope of solving the problem of induction.  Because BonJour’s 
claims about the problem of induction play a central role in both his critique of empiricism and 
his defense of rationalism, it is important to know whether the rationalist solution he offers 
actually succeeds.   
 After providing a brief overview of BonJour’s solution in section I, I carefully examine 
the probability claims that form the core of his account in sections II and III.  I argue that on the 
most charitable interpretation of these claims, almost all of the published objections that have 
been raised against them are erroneous.  In section IV I argue that the most serious challenge 
facing BonJour’s account stems from the purported necessity of claims he makes about the 
relative frequencies of worlds within the total class of possible worlds.  After reflecting on the 
potential circularity and circuitousness of BonJour’s solution (section V), I conclude that he has 
failed to offer a viable solution to the problem of induction. 
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I. 
BonJour (1998, 188ff.) sets up his solution by considering the class of inductive inferences 
where the following conditions are known to obtain: 
(1.1) m/n of observed As are Bs. 
(1.2) A large number of As have been observed. 
(1.3) Property A is logically independent of property B. 
(1.4) Each of the following observational conditions has been varied to a substantial 
degree:  
(a) The locations of observation; 
(b) The times of observation; 
(c) The identity of the observers; and 
(d) Any further conditions of the cognitive environment justifiably believed to be 
relevant to an accurate determination of the frequency of As in the 
population of Bs. 
(1.5) There is “no relevant background information available concerning either the 
incidence of Bs in the class of As or the connection, if any, between being A and 
being B.”  (BonJour 1998, 189) 
(1.6) The “observed proportion of As that are Bs, rather than varying irregularly over the 
range of possible values, converges over time to the fraction m/n and thereafter 
remains at least approximately constant as significant numbers of new 
observations come in.”  (BonJour 1998, 207) 
When (1.1) through (1.6) are all true, BonJour refers to (1.1) as a ‘standard inductive premise.’  
The ‘standard inductive conclusion’ in such a case will be: 
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(1.7) m/n As are Bs.1 
BonJour (1998, 189) characterizes the challenge posed by the problem of induction as follows: 
Is there any sort of rationale that can be offered for thinking that conclusions reached in 
this way are likely to be true if the inductive premise is true—or even that the chance that 
such a conclusion is true is enhanced to any degree at all by the truth of such a premise?  
If we understand epistemic justification in the way discussed earlier in this book, that is, 
as justification that increases to some degree the likelihood that the justified belief is true 
and that is thus conducive to finding the truth, the issue is whether inductive reasoning 
confers any degree of epistemic justification, however small, on its conclusion. 
BonJour’s (1998, 207) response to this challenge is based on the idea that “an objective 
regularity of a sort that would make the conclusion of a standard inductive argument true 
provides the best explanation for the truth of the premise of such an argument.”  Thus, in certain 
respects, BonJour’s project is a continuation of Gilbert Harman’s (1965; 1967; 1968) earlier 
attempt to show that inductive inference is a species of inference to the best explanation.   
 BonJour’s a priori justification of induction proceeds in two stages.  The first stage 
attempts to establish that it is highly likely there exists a non-chance explanation for why (1.1) 
through (1.6) are all true.  BonJour (1998, 207-208) writes, 
From an intuitive standpoint, the overwhelmingly obvious question to ask is: what is the 
explanation for this situation?  Why does the observed proportion continue to 
approximate m/n rather than fluctuating widely as new observations are made?  This is 
not a situation that would obtain for just any choice of A and B, and some reason seems to 
be needed for its occurring in the case in question.  Of course, it is logically possible that 
the results in question represent the operation of nothing more than mere random 
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coincidence or chance, but it seems evident, and, as far as I can see, evident on a purely a 
priori basis, that it is highly unlikely that only coincidence is at work, an unlikelihood 
that increases rapidly as the number of observations is made larger.   
On the basis of these reflections BonJour (1998, 208) claims that the following thesis is justified 
a priori: 
(I-1) In a situation in which a standard inductive premise obtains, it is highly likely that 
there is some explanation (other than mere coincidence or chance) for the 
convergence and constancy of the observed proportion (and the more likely, the 
larger the number of cases in question). 
In the second stage of his solution, BonJour argues that the most likely non-chance explanation 
for the truth of (1.1) through (1.6) is what he calls a ‘straight inductive explanation.’  According 
to such an explanation: 
the observed proportion [of As that are Bs] converges on m/n and thereafter remains 
relatively constant because (i) it is an objective, lawful fact about the world, deriving 
presumably from underlying causal processes or mechanisms of some sort, that 
approximately m/n of all As are Bs, and (ii) the observed cases represent an unbiased 
sample of As and thus accurately reflect this objective regularity.  (BonJour 1998, 209) 
BonJour (1998, 212) maintains that the following thesis regarding straight inductive explanations 
is justified a priori: 
(I-2) So long as the possibility that observation itself affects the proportion of As that are 
Bs is excluded, the best explanation, that is, the most likely to be true, for the truth 
of a standard inductive premise is the straight inductive explanation, namely that 
the observed proportion m/n accurately reflects (within a reasonable degree of 
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approximation) a corresponding objective regularity in the world (and this 
likelihood increases as the number of observations and the variety of the collateral 
circumstances of observation increases). 
According to BonJour, theses (I-1) and (I-2) are necessarily true.  He believes that if we can be 
justified in believing (I-1) and (I-2), we can both be justified in believing standard inductive 
conclusions and have in our possession a solution to the traditional problem of induction.   
 
II. 
Where the pair variable ‘〈S, N〉’ ranges over all ordered pairs whose first members are 
propositions expressed by standard inductive premises and whose second members are 
propositions stating that there exist non-chance explanations of the relevant premises, (I-1) can 
be represented as follows: 
(P1) ∀〈S, N〉[P(N|S) is high]. 
Letting ‘〈S, E〉‘ range over pairs of standard inductive premises and straight inductive 
explanations of those premises, (I-2) can be represented as: 
(P2) ∀〈S, E〉[P(E|S) is high]. 
Because BonJour (1998, 209) takes straight inductive explanations to entail standard inductive 
conclusions, (P2) entails: 
(P3) ∀〈S, C〉[P(C|S) is high], 
where ‘〈S, C〉‘ ranges over pairs of standard inductive premises and their respective standard 
inductive conclusions. 
 It is important to note that (P1) does not claim there is likely to be some non-chance 
explanation for every observed proportion.  There does not seem to be any reason why the fact 
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that some proportion of As have been observed to be Bs, taken by itself, should cry out for a non-
chance explanation.  What seems to require such an explanation, BonJour claims, is the fact that 
the observed proportion of As that are Bs has converged on a certain value and has remained 
relatively constant as significant numbers of new observations come in, that a large number of As 
have been observed, that A and B are logically independent, and that relevant observational 
conditions have been varied to a substantial degree.  Thus, it is essential that any adequate 
assessment of BonJour’s project interpret his claims about ‘standard inductive evidence’ as 
including not only propositions like (1.1) but propositions like (1.2) through (1.6) as well.  
Similar considerations apply to (P2).  Whatever likelihood straight inductive explanations 
possess is due to relations they bear to standard inductive evidence, not to any a priori likelihood 
they possess on their own.   
 Some of BonJour’s critics seem to misunderstand what the relevant evidence base is for 
the conditional probability judgment made in (I-1) and (I-2).  Hilary Kornblith (2000, 85, 
emphasis added), for example, writes: 
Let us take a concrete example.  All the crows I’ve seen have been black.  Should I 
believe that all crows are black, and, if so, why?  BonJour grants that it is not a priori 
likely that the world is orderly rather than chaotic.  And of course it is not a priori likely 
that all crows are black relative to no evidence at all.  But relative to the evidence that all 
crows I’ve seen have been black, BonJour says that it is a priori likely that all crows are 
black.  Now why should this be so?  In particular, given that it is no more likely a priori 
that I live in an ordered world than that I live in a world without order, why should my 
observation of a bunch of black crows give me any sort of reason, by itself, to think that 
all crows are black?  BonJour’s answer is that we are justified in believing this a priori.   
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In asking why an observation of “a bunch of black crows” should give him any reason by itself 
to think that all crows are black, Kornblith seems to be taking standard inductive evidence to 
include only propositions like (1.1).  This leads Kornblith (ibid.) to claim: 
I don’t know whether I am idiosyncratic here, but I don’t find this suggestion any more 
plausible than the suggestion which BonJour agrees is implausible, that it is a priori likely 
that the world is orderly rather than chaotic.  I recognize that this doesn’t count as an 
argument, but I’m at a loss as to what else I should say on this score. 
BonJour would agree that the observation of a bunch of crows “by itself” can only justify 
someone in believing that some observed crows are black.  That observation cannot even justify 
one in believing a standard inductive premise, since this involves not only propositions such as 
(1.1) but propositions such as (1.2) through (1.6) as well.  Furthermore, BonJour would agree 
that this observation alone cannot justify one in believing either that the standard inductive 
conclusion is true or that the standard inductive premise provides support for the standard 
inductive conclusion.  Further justificatory resources are certainly needed, many of which will be 
provided by rational insight. 
 Other critics have expressed skepticism about the a priori reasoning process BonJour’s 
solution allows us to go through when considering particular inductive inferences.  Anthony 
Brueckner (2001, 5), for example, has raised the following concern.  Letting ‘Pr( )’ stand for ‘It 
is highly likely that( )’ and ‘A( )’ for ‘We know a priori that( ),’ Brueckner glosses BonJour’s 
theses (I-1) and (I-2) as: 
(*) A[Pr(There is some correct explanation for the truth of a standard inductive premise)] 
and 
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(**) A[Pr(If e is the correct explanation for the truth of a standard inductive premise, then 
e is a straight inductive explanation)]. 
From (*) and (**), Brueckner claims we can conclude: 
(***) A[Pr(There is some correct, straight inductive explanation for the truth of a 
standard inductive premise)]. 
The problem, as Brueckner (2001, 5) sees it, is this: 
But now it appears that we have something like a recipe for turning individual inductive 
inferences into deductions, contrary to BonJour’s intention as described above.  For any 
such inference, there will be an a priori argument involving *, ** and *** for the thesis 
that it is likely that the inductive inference’s conclusion is true.  This is not quite the same 
thing as turning induction into deduction, however, since the BonJour-style a priori 
argument does not yield the unvarnished thesis that the given inference’s conclusion is 
true simpliciter. 
Brueckner, however, misrepresents not only theses (I-1) and (I-2) but the nature of the 
justification BonJour claims we can have for standard inductive conclusions as well. 
 Brueckner interprets (I-1) as the claim that we can know a priori that it is highly likely 
there is some correct explanation for the truth of a standard inductive premise.  Although 
BonJour claims that (I-1) can be known a priori, (I-1) does not itself make any claims about the 
epistemic status of any proposition.  Thus, (*) should not include an epistemic operator.  Even if 
Brueckner had left the ‘A( )’ off of (*), it still would have failed to make clear the fact that (I-1) 
is making a claim about a certain conditional probability.  Similar remarks apply to Brueckner’s 
use of the epistemic operator ‘A( )’ in (**).  Moreover, Brueckner represents (I-2) as a 
conditional claim falling within the scope of a probability operator (which, of course, falls within 
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the scope of an epistemic operator).  But (I-2) is primarily a claim about a certain conditional 
probability, and probabilities of conditionals have been shown to be nonequivalent to conditional 
probabilities.2  Even if it were appropriate to render (I-2) as a claim about the probability of a 
conditional, the obvious choice would have been: 
(****) P(If (1.1) through (1.6) are true, the observed proportion m/n accurately reflects a 
corresponding objective regularity in the world) is high 
rather than the one Brueckner provides.  Whatever logical relation (**)—with or without the   
‘A( )’ operator—may bear to (I-2), it is not one of logical equivalence.   
 Furthermore, Brueckner’s worry that BonJour is “turning individual inductive inferences 
into deductions” is misplaced.  BonJour does attempt to provide resources for constructing a 
certain kind of deductively valid argument concerning individual inductive inferences.  But this 
sort of deductive argument appears harmless once it is properly understood.  Let ‘S1’ denote a 
particular standard inductive premise; ‘C1’ the corresponding standard inductive conclusion; ‘N1’ 
the claim that there is a non-chance explanation of S1; and ‘E1’ a straight inductive explanation of 
S1.  BonJour’s solution allows us to construct the following valid argument about the inference 
from S1 to C1: 
(2.1) P(N1⏐S1) is high. 
(2.2) P(E1⏐S1) is high. 
(2.3) ∴, P(C1⏐S1) is high. 
(2.1) and (2.2) follow from (P1) and (P2) by universal instantiation.  (Interestingly enough, (2.3) 
follows from (2.2) alone because, on BonJour’s account, a straight inductive explanation entails 
the relevant standard inductive conclusion.  Thus, there appears to be no genuine need to suppose 
that (2.1) is true.  BonJour, however, apparently thinks premises such as (2.1) are essential to the 
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justification of inductive inferences.)  The important thing to notice is that (2.3) is not a standard 
inductive conclusion.  Rather, it is a conditional probability claim about the relation between a 
standard inductive premise and a standard inductive conclusion.  So, the argument from (2.1) to 
(2.3) is not a case where an induction has been turned into a deduction.   
 Furthermore, there should not be anything worrisome about the fact that BonJour’s 
account licenses a deductive argument for (2.3) because if (2.3) were added as a premise to a 
standard inductive argument, the latter would remain inductive and, therefore, invalid.  Consider 
the following argument: 
(3.1) S1 is true. 
(3.2) P(N1⏐S1) is high. 
(3.3) P(E1⏐S1) is high. 
(3.4) E1 entails C1. 
(3.5) P(C1⏐S1) is high. 
(3.6) ∴, C1 is true. 
Statements (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) appear in the present argument as premises (3.2), (3.3) and (3.5), 
respectively.  (This formulation of the argument is somewhat infelicitous because (3.5) actually 
functions as something like an inductive inference rule rather than as a premise.  If we insist 
upon representing all our inference rules as premises, we will be faced with the same problem 
that befuddled Lewis Carroll’s (1895/1995) Achilles.)  Note that the inference to (3.6), a 
standard inductive conclusion, is not deductively valid.  (3.5) can be deductively inferred from 
(3.3) and (3.4), but the inference from (3.1) and (3.5) to (3.6) is at best inductively strong.  Thus, 
although BonJour’s solution gives us the resources to construct a deductive argument for (2.3), 
the deductive argument from (2.1) to (2.3) is not a standard inductive argument and the addition 
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of (2.3) to a standard inductive argument does not turn the latter into a deduction.  So, it is not 
the case that BonJour’s a priori justification of induction attempts to turn inductions into 
deductions. 
 Brueckner is also worried about the apparent fact that “For any [standard inductive] 
inference, there will be an a priori argument involving *, ** and *** for the thesis that it is likely 
that the inductive inference’s conclusion is true.”  Brueckner seems to misunderstand how 
BonJour thinks both a priori and a posteriori elements contribute to the justification of an 
inductive conclusion.  BonJour maintains that our justification for premises (3.2) through (3.5) 
would be a priori, but our justification for (3.1)—an observational premise about contingent 
facts in the actual world—can only be a posteriori.  As a result, our justification for believing 
(3.6) will have both a priori and a posteriori components.  BonJour (1998, 2) follows the 
philosophical tradition in calling the total justification conferred upon such a conclusion a 
posteriori.  Thus, BonJour’s account does not have the untoward consequence of allowing purely 
a priori knowledge of contingently true inductive conclusions.   
 
III. 
As we have seen, BonJour takes the central theses of his solution to the problem of induction to 
be necessarily true.  Commenting on the modal status of (I-1), BonJour (1998, 208-209) writes: 
Thus the relevant claim would be that it is true in all possible worlds that there is likely to 
be a non-chance explanation for the truth of a standard inductive premise.  This would 
not mean, of course, that there could not be cases in a particular possible world in which 
such a non-chance explanation was in fact not to be found.  It does not even mean that in 
a particular possible world, which might of course be the actual world, such cases in 
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which there is no non-chance explanation for the truth of a standard inductive premise 
could not be substantially more numerous than those for which an explanation exists.  
But it would mean that such possible worlds involve the repeated recurrence of an 
unlikely situation—and hence that they are quite rare and unlikely within the total class 
of possible worlds.  And this in turn would make the claim that the actual world is not 
such a world itself highly likely to be true, which is essentially what thesis (I-1) says. 
Thus, although BonJour believes (I-1) to be necessarily true, he also subscribes to the following 
claims: 
(P4) Counter-inductive worlds are possible.3 
(P5) Standard inductive premises that are true at counter-inductive worlds make probable 
the existence of non-chance explanations of those premises—even though no non-
chance explanations of those premises exist at counter-inductive worlds.   
BonJour also seems to be clearly committed to the following claims as well: 
(P6) Standard inductive premises that are true at counter-inductive worlds make probable 
straight inductive explanations of those premises—even though no straight 
inductive explanations of those premises are correct at counter-inductive worlds.   
(P7) Standard inductive premises that are true at counter-inductive worlds make probable 
their respective standard inductive conclusions—even though standard inductive 
conclusions are rarely (if ever) true at counter-inductive worlds.   
 An important question to ask at this juncture is whether there is an interpretation of 
probability claims (P1) through (P7) that can make all of them true or at least coherent.  
Brueckner (2001, 6, notation altered) expresses the following doubts about there being such an 
interpretation: 
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The special status of such alleged truths bears some reflection....  BonJour’s view on 
these matters requires a conception of probability according to which the inductive 
premise makes the conclusion highly likely even in the counter-inductive worlds in which 
the corresponding conclusion is false.  On such a conception, we cannot interpret S makes 
C highly likely as meaning that the conditional probability of C given S is high.  That 
probability is zero, since 
P(C|S) = P(C & S)/P(S) 
and 
P(C & S) = 0. 
According to Brueckner, claims such as (P7) are not only false but obviously so.  It is the 
obvious (apparent) falsity of (P7) and related claims that Brueckner finds puzzling and leads him 
to suggest that either (a) what BonJour means by ‘S makes C highly likely’ must be something 
other than ‘the conditional probability of C given S is high’ or (b) BonJour’s position is 
ultimately incoherent. 
 The difficulty with Brueckner’s interpretation is that he assumes that conditional 
probabilities can only be understood as relative frequencies of a certain kind.  Consider the 
following reformulation of (P7): 
(P7') ‘P(C|S) is high’ is true at counter-inductive worlds. 
On a frequentist view, ‘P(C|S)’ will be a measure of the proportion of C-worlds (i.e., worlds 
where ‘C’ is true) within the (perhaps restricted) set of S-worlds (i.e., worlds where ‘S’ is true).  
Brueckner assumes that set of S-worlds relevant for determining the value of the function 
‘P(C|S)’ must be the set of counter-inductive S-worlds.  However, this assumption is not 
mandated by the relative frequency interpretation of ‘P(C|S).’  The relevant reference class (i.e., 
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the relevant set of S-worlds) could very well be the entire set of S-worlds, which would include 
both counter-inductive and normal worlds.  On such an interpretation, the value of ‘P(C|S)’ 
would be non-zero.  If the relevant conditional probability were high, it would be high in all 
possible worlds, including counter-inductive worlds.  Indeed, if the relevant reference class in 
(P7') were the entire set of S-worlds, the source of Brueckner’s puzzlement would be removed.  
Consider the following, analogous cases: 
(4.1) ‘George W. Bush was elected President of the United States in the actual world’ is 
true in all possible worlds. 
(4.2) ‘It is impossible for two plus two to equal five’ is true in the actual world.   
The fact that (4.1) mentions a statement that is true in all possible worlds does not mean that 
Bush needs to be elected President in every possible world in order for the statement as a whole 
to be true.  The fact that (4.2) mentions a statement that is true in the actual world does not mean 
that the impossibility of two plus two equaling five should be determined only by what the sum 
of two and two is in the actual world.  Similar considerations apply to (P7').   
 Accordingly, the most charitable interpretation of BonJour’s probability claims seems to 
be one where probabilities concern frequencies across all possible worlds.  Call such a view 
‘modal frequentism.’4  Because modal frequentism entails that probabilities remain the same 
across all possible worlds, it can make sense of BonJour’s claim that (I-1), (I-2) and (P1) through 
(P7) are all necessarily true.  Since modal frequentist claims express relationships between 
infinitely large sets of worlds, the relevant frequencies cannot be determined by simple ratios of 
the worlds picked out by attribute and reference classes.  Modal frequentists must therefore 
appeal to the notion of limiting frequency.  Consider an infinitely long (perhaps randomly 
selected) sequence of Si-worlds.  Where ‘n’ denotes the nth place in this sequence and ‘m’ the 
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number of Ci-worlds in a given segment of the sequence, P(Ci⏐Si) will be the limit toward which 
the value of m/n converges as n increases toward infinity.  (Of course, if there is no limit toward 
which m/n converges, the value of P(Ci⏐Si) will be undefined.)  Thus, according to the modal 
frequentist interpretation, (P1) is equivalent to the following claim about every standard 
inductive premise: within the set of worlds where a standard inductive premise is true, the 
limiting frequency of worlds where there exists a non-chance explanation of that premise is high.  
(P2) and (P3) make similar claims about straight inductive explanations and standard inductive 
conclusions.  (P4) can be understood as the claim that the limiting frequency of counter-
inductive worlds within the total class of worlds is greater than 0.   
 
IV. 
In a footnote to his remarks about the relative rarity of counter-inductive worlds, BonJour (1998, 
209, n. 24) writes: 
This way of putting the matter assumes in effect that it is possible to make sense of the 
relative size of classes of possible worlds, even though both those classes and the total set 
of possible worlds are presumably infinite.  But I have no space to go into the issues 
surrounding this assumption and must be content here with saying that its intuitive 
credentials in other cases (e.g., the claim that there are twice as many positive integers as 
even integers) seem to me strong enough to make it reasonable to construe the difficulties 
as problems to be solved and not as insuperable objections. 
These comments not only confirm that BonJour’s central theses should be understood from the 
perspective of modal frequentism; they also point to the most serious challenge for any such 
approach.  Limiting frequencies within infinite classes can only be defined relative to sequences 
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(i.e., ordered sets) of worlds.  When the reference and attribute classes are finite, the order (or 
lack thereof) is irrelevant because relative frequencies within finite sets can be determined by 
simple ratios of the cardinalities of the sets.  When dealing with infinite sets, however, order 
becomes crucial.  For example, although it is plausible to think that the relative frequency of the 
positive even integers within the set of all positive integers is ½, it is only when the positive 
integers are taken in a particular order that this is the case.  If, for example, the integers are 
ordered so that even numbers appear in every fourth place (i.e., 1, 3, 5, 2, 7, 9, 11, 4, 13, 15, 17, 
6,…), their relative frequency converges to ¼ rather than ½.  In fact, by suitably reordering the 
integers, we can make the limiting frequency of evens converge to any value between 0 and 1.  
The “intuitive credentials” of thinking the frequency of evens is ½ seems to stem from the fact 
that there is a conventional or privileged ordering of integers, relative to which this is true.   
 The critical question for BonJour is which sequences of worlds are the basis for his 
claims about the limiting frequencies of counter-inductive worlds within the total set of possible 
worlds and about the limiting frequencies of worlds where standard inductive conclusions are 
true within the set of worlds where their standard inductive premises are true.  The crucial 
difficulty is that there is no privileged or natural ordering of worlds to which BonJour can 
appeal.  Yet if his claims about limiting frequencies are not relativized to any particular 
sequence(s) of worlds, the frequencies in question will be undefined and hence BonJour’s claims 
about them cannot be true.5  Unfortunately, as his remarks in the previous quotation make clear, 
BonJour does not take any steps toward resolving this difficulty.   
 In the absence of a privileged ordering of worlds, it seems the modal frequentist’s best 
bet is to make an appeal to randomness, where (P1) through (P7) are understood as claims about 
limiting frequencies within random sequences of worlds.6  For example, (P3) could be viewed as 
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the claim that, for every 〈S, C〉, the limiting frequency of C-worlds within every random 
sequence of S-worlds is high.  The analogous claim about even numbers would be that the 
limiting frequency of evens in every random sequence of positive integers would be ½.  The 
randomness requirement is intended to limit the set of admissible sequences so that sequences 
gerrymandered to achieve any desired result are excluded.   
 A variety of highly technical definitions of randomness have been proposed during the 
last half-century.  However, because BonJour’s claims about frequencies are something ordinary 
subjects are supposed to be able to apprehend without the need of advanced mathematical 
training, many of these definitions will not suit his purposes.  Remaining on an intuitive level, 
then, it seems that a sequence will be random when there is no discernible pattern or regularity in 
the arrangement of its members and when knowing the value of the first n items in the sequence 
provides no basis for predicting the value of the n + 1st item.7  Given this understanding of 
randomness, an immediate question that arises for BonJour’s probability claims (understood as 
claims about limiting frequencies in infinite random sequences) is why anyone should believe 
they are true.  Why should we think the limiting frequency of C-worlds within every random 
sequence of S-worlds is high?  And why should the limiting frequency of counter-inductive 
worlds in every random sequence of worlds be less than the limiting frequency of normal 
worlds?   
 The following thought experiment may provide some intuitive support for the claim 
BonJour makes about even numbers above.  Perhaps it can then be modified to support 
BonJour’s modal frequentist claims about normal and counter-inductive worlds.   
Cosmic Lottery I Imagine a cosmic lottery machine that contains an infinite number 
of lottery balls.  (Even though such a lottery machine is physically impossible, we 
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can imagine such a device being simulated in the mind of God.)  On each ball is 
inscribed one positive integer, and for every positive integer there is a ball with 
that number on it.  The machine selects an infinitely long random sequence of 
balls.8  The limiting frequency of even numbers within the sequence, as the 
number of drawn balls approaches infinity, is computed. 
Would the limiting frequency of evens within such a sequence be ½?  There seems to be some 
intuitive pull toward answering “Yes,” although this intuition does not seem to be universally 
shared.  Consider also the following question: Would the limiting frequency of even numbers be 
greater than the limiting frequency of prime numbers in such an infinite random sequence?  
There seems (to me, at any rate) to be a stronger intuitive pull toward answering “Yes” to this 
second question than there is toward answering “Yes” to the previous one.  (Potential problems 
with these would-be intuitions will be addressed below.) 
 Now consider a possible worlds variant of the cosmic lottery case: 
Cosmic Lottery II Imagine a cosmic lottery machine that contains an infinite number 
of lottery balls.  On each ball is inscribed an expression referring to a particular 
possible world, and for each possible world there is a ball containing an 
expression that refers to it.  (Never mind what sorts of expressions these might be.  
Since we can again imagine the set-up being simulated in the mind of God, it 
seems an omniscient being should be able to refer to any particular possible 
world.)  The machine selects an infinitely long random sequence of balls.  The 
limiting frequency of normal worlds within the sequence, as the number of drawn 
balls approaches infinity, is compared to the limiting frequency of counter-
inductive worlds. 
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Would the limiting frequency of normal worlds be greater than the limiting frequency of counter-
inductive worlds?  I have to confess that I see no reason why it should be.  Suppose another 
lottery machine contains only those balls that refer to worlds at which a particular standard 
inductive premise is true.  As the number of drawn balls increases toward infinity, would the 
limiting frequency of worlds where the corresponding standard inductive conclusion is also true 
be greater than the limiting frequency of worlds where the conclusion is not true?  Once again, I 
feel no intuitive pull toward answering “Yes” to this question.  In contrast to the cosmic lottery 
case involving numbers, I have no intuitions at all about the relevant frequencies of these worlds.   
 Critics of course will allege that whatever intuitions we do have in the even number case 
will be illicitly based upon our habit of taking the integers in their conventional order.  Our 
intuitions are supposed to be independent of our knowledge about integers in their conventional 
ordering, yet it seems that this knowledge is the very thing that gives rise to them.  Indeed, 
without our knowledge that evens are more frequent than primes within this ordering, it is not 
clear that we would have any intuitions at all about the matter.  And in fact this is exactly what 
we find in the case involving worlds.  Because there is no conventional or privileged ordering of 
possible worlds, we find ourselves bereft of intuitions about the frequencies of normal and 
counter-inductive worlds.  (A further complicating factor to consider is that the number of balls 
in Cosmic Lottery I is countably infinite, while the number of balls in Cosmic Lottery II is 
uncountable.)   
 The essential difficulty for BonJour’s solution to the problem of induction is that it must 
be possible for us to apprehend a priori facts about the comparative frequencies of certain kinds 
of worlds (and perhaps also to apprehend them fairly easily).  And yet it is far from clear how 
this could be possible.  Not only has BonJour failed to provide us with an account of what it 
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would mean for one sort of world to be more frequent in the total set of possible worlds than 
another, he has also given no clues about how we could recognize such facts if they were to 
obtain.  If BonJour wants to remain committed to the claim that counter-inductive worlds are less 
frequent within the total class of possible worlds than normal worlds and that worlds where 
standard inductive conclusions are true are quite frequent within the set of worlds where standard 
inductive premises are true, he must find a way to deal with the profound semantic, metaphysical 
and epistemological difficulties facing such a proposal.9  Because he has not done so, he cannot 
be said to have solved the problem of induction.   
 
V. 
I conclude my discussion of BonJour’s rationalist abductivism with two final considerations.  
Although there are many conceptions of what the problem of induction is and what a solution to 
it must provide, BonJour (1998, 189) characterizes the problem of induction as the challenge of 
finding an answer to the following question: 
Is there any sort of rationale that can be offered for thinking that conclusions reached in 
this way are likely to be true if the inductive premise is true—or even that the chance that 
such a conclusion is true is enhanced to any degree at all by the truth of such a premise?   
In other words, solving the problem of induction would mean showing the following to be true: 
(P3) ∀〈S, C〉[P(C|S) is high]. 
BonJour’s reason for thinking (P3) is true is that we can see a priori that straight inductive 
explanations are more likely to be true than their competitors and that straight inductive 
explanations entail standard inductive conclusions.  Recall that the relation of a priori likelihood 
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that purportedly obtains between standard inductive premises and straight inductive explanations 
was represented as: 
(P2) ∀〈S, E〉[P(E|S) is high]. 
Thus, the reason BonJour offers for believing (P3) is true is that we can see a priori that (P2) is 
true and that (P2) entails (P3).   
 However, the probabilification relation BonJour believes to obtain between inductive 
premises and straight inductive explanations in (P2) is the very same sort of relation that 
purportedly obtains between inductive premises and inductive conclusions in (P3).  If the 
problem of induction stems from our apparent inability to provide non-circular reasons for 
thinking the latter relation obtains, that problem will not be resolved by any “rationale” that 
appeals to the obtaining of that same relation.  Yet that is just what BonJour’s proposal attempts 
to do.  It seems, however, that an adequate solution to the problem of induction should provide 
independent reasons for believing the latter sort of relation obtains.10 
 Moreover, because BonJour believes the relevant probability relations that obtain 
between inductive premises and conclusions can be apprehended a priori, one wonders why he 
doesn’t simply skip all talk of “the best explanation” and jump straight to the following claim: 
(P8) We can know that inductive premises support inductive conclusions because we can 
grasp a priori the necessary truth that the former probabilify the latter.   
Since the truth of (P3), which is entailed by (P8), can be grasped in the same a priori way as the 
truth of (P2), it is not clear how much the discussion of (P2) and the explanatory superiority of 
straight inductive explanations really adds to BonJour’s proposal.  Of course, offering (P8) as his 
solution to the problem of induction would make solving the problem of induction seem so easy 
that few would believe the problem had actually been solved.  If we can simply “see” that 
Rationalist Abductivism 22
inductive premises make inductive conclusions likely, it will be completely mysterious why 
philosophers for centuries have thought the problem of induction presented us with a serious and 
perhaps unanswerable challenge.  While (P8) does not represent BonJour’s official solution to 
the problem of induction, it certainly seems to be entailed by that solution.  Moreover, it seems 
that the other considerations BonJour offers are unnecessary, given his ultimate views about a 
priori probabilities.  Thus, it appears that BonJour needs to explain how some of the greatest 
minds in philosophy could be duped into thinking inductive skepticism posed a serious threat 
when in fact it can be avoided quite easily. 
 
VI. 
BonJour’s a priori justification of induction is an intriguing attempt to solve one of the most 
intractable problems in the history of epistemology.  Although it does not suffer from many of 
the flaws that critics allege it does, BonJour’s appeals to limiting frequencies within infinite sets 
of worlds remain deeply problematic and the prospects for overcoming these difficulties do not 
seem to be bright.  Thus, it seems the venerable problem of induction has resisted yet another 
attempt at resolving it.11 
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 1 Instead of treating claims (1.2) through (1.6) as premises in a standard inductive argument, BonJour treats 
them as background conditions that need to be satisfied in order for (1.1) to count as a standard inductive premise.  
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As a result, the inductive arguments BonJour focuses on typically have only one premise and one conclusion.  In 
what follows I will treat (1.2) through (1.6) as premises because our knowledge of them, on BonJour’s account, is 
part of what justifies us in believing a standard inductive conclusion. 
 2 Cf. Lewis (1976) for the technical details of such a proof. 
3 BonJour (1998, 204-205) also makes the following claims: 
An a priori justification of induction need not involve the claim, which so many have rightly found 
implausible, that the principle of induction (as roughly formulated in §7.1) or some similar principle 
concerning the uniformity of nature is a self-evident, a priori truth.  Such a claim seems obviously 
untenable.  It would mean, as has again been widely pointed out, that a chaotic universe could somehow be 
ruled out as even an a priori possibility; whereas it seems clear on an intuitive basis that this is not so, that 
such a universe is a priori quite possible.  
 4 Reichenbach’s (1949, §§73, 80) attempt to extend the frequency interpretation to cover both the 
probabilities of statements and the modalities constitutes an early form of modal frequentism.   
 5 Cf. Wrenn (2006) for a series of well-aimed attacks on BonJour’s claims about the relative frequencies of 
normal and counter-inductive worlds using what Reichenbach (1949, §40) calls a ‘geometric interpretation’ of 
frequentist probability. 
 6 Some frequentists—e.g., von Mises (1957)—have denied that the notion of probability has any 
application to sequences that are not random.  Other frequentists—e.g., Reichenbach (1949, 132, 151)—have not 
required sequences to satisfy a randomness constraint in order for their frequency theories to be applied.   
 7 In addition to seeming to do a fair job of capturing the central threads of the intuitive notion of 
randomness, the current definition also seems to comport well with the spirit of some of the most prominent 
technical accounts of randomness, including Kolmogorov’s (1965) definition of a random sequence as one where 
the shortest program that can generate it is no shorter than the one that simply lists the elements of the sequence one 
by one and equivalent definitions in terms of informational incompressibility.  It also seems to square well with von 
Mises’ (1957) informal explication of his notion of randomness in terms of the impossibility of a successful 
gambling system (i.e., an illusory scheme to make one’s chances at gambling greater than those predicted by a 
mathematical calculation of the odds).   
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 8 The relevant notion of randomness should be understood to apply to sequences themselves rather than to 
the processes that generate those sequences.  The reason for this qualification is that it is possible for a random 
process to generate (by chance) a highly ordered and hence non-random sequence.   
 9 A further difficulty with BonJour’s claims about the relative rarity of counter-inductive worlds is that 
these claims seem to run afoul of plausible restrictions on what an a priori solution to the problem of induction can 
deliver.  On the one hand, BonJour (1998, 213) writes: 
Reichenbach insists, correctly, that the thesis that the world is completely chaotic is neither impossible nor 
even unlikely from a strictly a priori standpoint, and I have said nothing to dispute this claim. 
Thus, BonJour claims it is not a priori unlikely that the world should be chaotic.  Yet he insists it is a priori unlikely 
that the world is counter-inductive.  If the first claim is true, it is not clear how the second one can be true.  Part of 
the worry with the second sort of claim stems from the intuition that there cannot be a wholly a priori solution to the 
problem of induction.  Throughout most of his account, BonJour writes as if a priori and a posteriori justificatory 
components combine to justify standard inductive conclusions.  For example, he maintains that if we are a posteriori 
justified in believing a standard inductive premise, we can be a priori justified in believing that the standard 
inductive premise makes probable the relevant standard inductive conclusion.  The justification of the conclusion 
will thus have both a priori and a posteriori components.  However, if we can know that counter-inductive worlds 
are a priori unlikely, it is not clear that we need any a posteriori justificatory element at all to solve the problem of 
induction.  If we can simply see by the power of rational insight the relative rarity of counter-inductive worlds, then 
the appropriate response to the challenge of inductive skepticism is that we can simply see that it is false.  This, of 
course, does not represent BonJour’s strategy and indeed seems inconsistent with the overall tenor of his approach.  
Yet it seems to be allowed by some of his remarks.  
 10 Harman (1965; 1967; 1968) has argued that inductive inferences are actually inferences to the best 
explanations and, therefore, that the distinction between induction and abduction collapses.  Fumerton (1980) 
maintains the distinction collapses in the other direction, with all apparently abductive inferences being either 
straightforwardly inductive inferences or inferences that combine inductive and deductive elements.  While 
BonJour’s project seems continuous with Harman’s to some extent, it is not clear whether BonJour wants to collapse 
this distinction altogether.  If BonJour were to deny the existence of a separate category of abductive inference, his 
response to the problem of induction would be circular by virtue of appealing to one form of inference to justify that 
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very same form of inference.  Yet even if BonJour were to preserve the distinction between inductive and abductive 
inference, his account would be circular because his account of seeing what the best explanation is appeals to the 
same a priori grasping of logical probabilities that he thinks is involved in seeing that an inductive premise supports 
an inductive conclusion. 
 11 I would like to thank John Kearns, Nick Shackel, Lisa Warenski, Roger White and audiences at the 2005 
Meeting of the Creighton Club and the 2006 Pacific Division Meeting of the APA for helpful comments and 
feedback on previous drafts of this essay. 
